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Abstract. In this paper we follow the BOID (Belief, Obligation, Inten-
tion, Desire) architecture to describe agents and agent types in Defeasible
Logic. We argue, in particular, that the introduction of obligations can
provide a new reading of the concepts of intention and intentionality.
Then we examine the notion of social agent (i.e., an agent where obliga-
tions prevail over intentions) and discuss some computational and philo-
sophical issues related to it. We show that the notion of social agent
either requires more complex computations or has some philosophical
drawbacks.
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1 Introduction
Reasoning about mental attitudes is a traditional issue in philosophy and has
widely investigated in the field of AI. Some classical agent systems based on
mental attitudes such as beliefs, desires and intentions are, for example, those
presented in [1,2,3].
More recent works on cognitive agents tried combine two apparently in-
dependent perspectives [4,5,6,7,8,9]: (a) a classical cognitive account of agents
that specifies their mental attitudes; (b) modelling agents’ behaviour by means
of normative concepts. For the first approach, the background is basically the
belief-desire-intention (BDI) architecture, where mental attitudes are taken as
primitives to give rise to a set of Intentional Agent Systems [3,1]. This view is
interesting especially when the behaviour of agents is the outcome of a rational
balance among their (possibly conflicting) mental states. The normative aspect
is rather based on the assumption that normative concepts play a role to charac-
terise the idea of social co-ordination of autonomous agents [10]. The nice result
of this combination of perspectives is that of leading to an account of agents’
deliberation and behaviour in terms of the interplay between mental attitudes
and normative (external) factors such as obligations.
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A crucial aspect in this recent trend is that reasoning about agents can
be embedded in frameworks based on non-monotonic logics, as one the most
interesting problems concerns the cases where the agent’s mental attitudes are
in conflict or when they are incompatible with obligations and other deontic
provisions. In this specific perspective, the relation between mental attitudes
and non-monotonicity should not sound surprising: works such as Thomason’s
[11] and on BOID [4] confirm this trend. Of particular interest is the BOID
architecture, which in fact provides a number of strategies for solving conflicts
among mental attitudes and obligations. BOID specifies logical criteria (i) to
retract agent’s attitudes with the changing environment, and so (ii) to settle
conflicts by stating different general policies corresponding to the agent type
considered. Agent types correspond to the different ways through which conflicts
are detected and solved: a realistic agent thus corresponds to a conflict-resolution
type in which beliefs override all other factors, while other agent types, such as
simple-minded, selfish or social ones adopt different orders of overruling.
Following [5,6,7], in this paper we take advantage of this research line and
discuss how the combination of mental attitudes and obligations can be framed in
Defeasible Logic (DL). As is well-known, DL is based on a logic programming-like
language and it is a simple, efficient but flexible non-monotonic formalism able
to deal with many different intuitions of non-monotonic reasoning and recently
applied in many fields. In addition, several efficient implementations have been
developed [12,13]. Here we discuss and extend some aspects of a non-monotonic
logic of agency, based on the framework of [14], developed in [6,7]. Indeed, DL is
one of the most expressive languages that allows for the definition of large sets
of patterns called agent types.
Our system, which considers here three components –beliefs, intentions, and
obligatios (BIO agents)– has some substantial peculiarities that make it different
from other frameworks such as BOID’s. In particular,
– the system develops a constructive account of those modalities that cor-
respond to mental states and obligations; rules are thus meant to devise
suitable logical conditions for introducing modalities; if so, rules may also
contain modalised literals;
– possible conversions of a modality into another can be accepted, as when the
applicability of rule leading to derive, fro example, OBLp (p is obligatory)
may permit, under appropriate conditions, to obtain INTp (p is intended).
Both aspects are necessary to account for some relatively simple, but important
reasoning patterns. In particular, we maintain that conversions are required to
capture some aspects of agents’ rationality.
A second result of this paper consists in showing that the proposed system is
computationally feasible. Indeed, we will prove that it is possible to compute the
complete set of consequences of a given theory in linear time, thus preserving
the nice computational features of standard DL.
However, despite the computational feasibiliy of the logic, we will argue that
the notion of agent type is problematic. Here, the focus will be in particular on
philosophical and computational aspects of the notion of social agent, by which
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we mean a norm-complying agent, but we will argue that similar considerations
also apply to other agent types.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical back-
ground of our system. In particular, since the concept of social agent focuses
on the interplay between obligations and intentions, we will discuss which kind
of intentions have to be considered in this regard. Section 3 will present our
logical framework, based on DL, which will embed our intuitions and permit
to deal with BIO agents. Section 4 presents a first discussion of the notion of
agent type; in particular, we will argue that conversions, too, are relevant in
identifying specific cognitive profiles for the agents; the section ends with an
open problem concerning the feasibility of agent types based on the strategies
for solving conflicts. Section 5 deals with the computational complexity of social
agency. A concluding section on related work completes the paper.
2 Norms, Beliefs and Intentions
2.1 Policy-based Motivations
This section provides some theoretical background for the rest of the paper.
Our focus is on the so-called policy-based attitudes. The term was coined by
Bratman [15] with specific reference to the idea of intention. The intuition be-
hind policy-based intention is based on Bratman’s view regarding future di-
rected intention and general intention. Bratman terms general intentions as gen-
eral/personal policies. Along with general policies go policy-based intentions. For
example, I have a general policy to patch up and reboot the Unix server in the
department once every month. This morning, on the basis of this policy, I form
the intention to reboot the machine at 7.00 pm in the evening. My intention
this morning to reboot the machine this evening is a policy-based intention. This
specific intention will play a major part in my planning process for the day as it
will pose problems about means and constrain my other options. Based on this
distinction Bratman makes the following classification of intentions: deliberative,
non-deliberative and policy-based.
The difference between the three is the following: When an agent i has an
intention of the form INTt1i ϕ, t2 (read as agent i intends at t1 to ϕ at t2) as a
process of present deliberation, then it is called deliberative intention. On the
other hand, if the agent comes to have such an intention not on the basis of
present deliberation, but at some earlier time t0 and has retained it from t0 to
t1 without reconsidering it, then this intention it is called non-deliberative. The
third case arises when intentions are general and concern potentially recurring
circumstances in an agent’s life. Such general intentions constitute policy-based
intentions. A policy-based intention is not a non-deliberative intention because
it is not simply a case of retaining an intention previously formed. Neither is it
a deliberative intention since it is not based on a full-blown deliberation where
an attempt is made to weigh pros and cons for and against conflicting options.
It also differs from an intention in favour of necessary means, i.e., intention in
favour of a specific end, in the sense that the defeasibility of general policies
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makes it possible to block the application of the policy to the particular case
without abandoning the policy. Otherwise one could abandon the intention in
favour of the end. The difference here is that in each case the policy concerns
not just a single future situation, but a kind of circumstance that is expected
to recur in the agent loop and in each case the agent might well have a general
intention to act in the particular circumstances. Whether the agent is able to
perform that action or not depends on the circumstances.
As argued in detail elsewhere [16], it may happen that a policy-based inten-
tion needs to be re-considered if not blocked for the application to particular
cases. But this does not mean that the agent should know all such conditions
in a scenario, but only those she considers necessary for the intended outcome
and that she is not confident of their being satisfied. To intend the necessary
consequence the agent has to make sure that all the evidence to the contrary
has been defeated, which is basically a defeasible conclusion.
The starting point of this paper is to extend the policy-based approach to
other attitudes and motivational factors such as beliefs and obligations. In this
way, all motivational factors are represented within a rule-based system: inten-
tions and beliefs are viewed as constituting the internal constraints (based on
policies) of an agent while obligations are her external constraints (based on
rules). As constraints they are defeasible. Notice, in particular, that such an ex-
tension to obligations can capture the well-known defeasible character of deontic
reasoning. In this last case, a policy-based obligation –conceived of as an external
motivational attitude– turns out to be simply a conditional obligation, namely,
a rule that allows for the inference of an obligation whenever the antecedent of
this rule holds [17,18].
2.2 Expected Side Effects and Agents’ Rationality
According to Bratman, rational agents can be basically modelled as follows:
– agents are goal-directed without being necessarily aware of their activity;
– intentions are used to choose partial plans for the realisation of a goal;
– not all consequences are intended but only some initial intentions and the
goal as a result of the plan; if some side-effects occur, they are never intended.
It is worthy discussing here the notion of side-effect. This well-known problem
has to deal with several variants of logical omniscience: the problem arises when
the agent is required to know all the truths defined by her logic, or when the logic
that depicts the agent automatically includes all the logical truths of classical
logic, or, finally, if the agent knows all the logical consequences of the known
propositions [19]. Indeed, the problem is usually referred to as the expected side-
effects problem [15], a problem which depends on the interactions between the
reasoning mechanism for the propositional inferences and the mechanism rul-
ing the introduction and the behaviour of the modal operators. A simple and
rather unsatisfactory solution would be to consider two completely unrelated
consequence relations, one for the propositional part and the second one for the
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modal operators. The consequence relation for a modal operator is meant to
give the condition under which one can prove a modal formula. For example
the pair Γ |∼X α, where X is a modal operator, means that if we can prove all
the formulas in Γ then we can deduce Xα. In what follows we will develop a
system for mental states and motivational attitudes based on this idea. However,
we will allow the consequence relation for intentions and obligations to interact
with the propositional module and we will also consider possible interactions
between the modal operators. To this end we have to show that the expected
side-effects phenomenon is not a drawback for policy-based agents: such a kind
of agents must accept the expected-side effects unless they have some reasons to
reject the consequences corresponding to them.
In effect, though our proposed theory does not entertain many of the proper-
ties leading to logical omniscience, some aspects of the side-effects problem are
accepted. Consider
INTSmoke, Smoke → Cancer |∼ INTCancer (1)
INTGoToRome, GoToRome → GoToItaly |∼ INTGoToItaly (2)
Actually, whereas the first case is clearly unacceptable, the second should
be accepted by a rational agent. In this perspective the side-effects problem is
similar to the substitution of indiscernible in opaque contexts. An agent may
have the intention to visit Rome and not to visit Italy. But if the agent knows
that Rome is the capital of Italy then it would be irrational of the agent not to
have the intention to go to Italy given the intention to visit Rome.
Accordingly, some cases of the side-effects problem are not necessarily a weak-
ness of a theory. This holds in particular if we assume that our agents are aware
of their activities. In our view, modelling rational agents corresponds to the
following assumptions:
– agents are aware of their activities, of their policies;
– some cases of the side-effects problem can be accepted;
– if a case has to be rejected this means that its unpleasant consequences
should not be intended;
– when unpleasant consequences are not intended, this only means that they
are blocked by conflicting attitudes or facts.
The theory an agent is equipped with can be understood as the specifi-
cation of the behaviour of the agent. If the agent is aware that B is an un-
avoidable/indisputable consequence of A and the agent intends A, then B is a
consequence of the agent’s intentions and the agent must accept it as part of
her intentions. Suppose we have that “raising one’s hand at an auction counts
as making a bid”. Thus if the agent (aware of this policy) intends to raise her
hand, then she intends to bid in the auction, and her action will be understood as
making a bid. In other words, in our system we will try to balance and moderate
some unpleasant aspects of the side-effects problem with the equally important
need for modelling rational agents. Of course, according to our view, we may
have that something is intended even if it is causally distant with respect to the
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original derived intentions. But this is not necessarily a drawback if we conceive
agents as rational and, as such, being aware of the policies which are related
with the environment and with their interests: even a causally distant behaviour
can be rationally intended unless it is removed in the meantime from deliber-
ation. But this case is indeed considered within our analysis because we may
have concrete contexts in which some policy-based intentions, as soon as they
are applicable, turn out to be overridden by other policies: we may have reasons
to argue that, if an agent intends A and believes that B is a consequence of
A, this is not a reason for necessarily intending B; in fact, the derivation of B
as an intention may be blocked, in our view, by competing attitudes or made
non-applicable by concrete facts.
According to the previous discussion it should be clear that, though inspired
by Bratman’s [15] analysis, the notion of intention we study in this paper is
slightly different, as it focuses on the idea of intentionality. In Bratman’s view
intentions are used to choose partial plans for the realisation of a goal; in this
way they have a close relation to means-ends. In our view intentions should be
related not only to means-ends but also to the their consequences.
This concept of intention is particularly relevant in conjunction with deontic
and normative notions, for example if we want to say that an agent is legally
responsible for A if the agent did A with the intention to do A. In such cases
the agent has to include in the set of her intentions not only her intentions in
Bratman’s sense but also some of their consequences. Our intuition is compat-
ible with von Wright’s [20] classical theory of normative actions. Von Wright’s
problem is to identify what should be the content of norms. He argues that
norms should deal with actions. Roughly, actions can be described in terms of
state transitions and as the sets of all changes of world that follow from them.
It is not our purpose discussing here von Wright’s theory of action. It should be
noted, however, that he considers the related problem of intentions. On the one
hand, von Wright is clear when he says that any action may have an arbitrary
number of consequences and not all of them are intended. On the other hand, he
provides a very broad concept of action, according to which all actions in norms,
strictly speaking, are intentional. If so, what are the boundaries of intentions to
be considered when they interplay with obligations?
Let us see how to recast Bratman’s Strategic Bomber scenario [15] in this
perspective. The basic scenario runs as follows: Strategic Bomber intends to
bomb a munition plant of the enemy being aware that the resulting explosion
will kill innocent children in a nearby school. Bratman argues that Strategic
Bomber does not have the intention to kill the children. Let us expand the
scenario by supposing that despite the bombing, Strategic Bomber loses the war,
and that there is a process for war crimes against him. Civil casualties are a sad
but almost unavoidable consequence of war, but usually the killing of civilians
does not constitute a war crime if there was no intention to kill. According to
Bratman, Strategic Bomber did not commit a war crime since he did not have
such an intention. However, let us assume that Strategic Bomber did not do
anything to prevent or minimise civil casualties (let us say by a movement of
Norms, Beliefs, Intentions in Defeasible Logic 7
troops that might have resulted in an evacuation of the area surrounding the
munition plant). In this extended scenario the killing of children is brought about
by a (successful) intentional act of Strategic Bomber. Accordingly, he must be
held responsible for the killing of innocent civilians.
Given this interpretation of intentions, we will see in the rest of this paper
that some standard accounts of agent types, and of social agents in particular,
are not satisfactory.
3 BIO Agents in Defeasible Logic
3.1 Basics of Defeasible Logic
Defeasible Logic (DL) was originally proposed by Nute [21,22] with a particular
concern about computational efficiency and developed over the years notably
by [23,24,14]. DL is suitable for implementations [25], is flexible [14] (it has a
constructively defined and easy to use proof theory), and it is modular [24] (it
can be easily extended to cover different logical components: besides the current
contribution, see, e.g., [6,7]). In addition, DL is efficient: it is possible to compute
the complete set of consequences of a given theory in linear time [26]. As we will
see, this result also applies to the logical framework presented in this paper.
Knowledge in DL can be represented in two ways: facts and rules.
Facts are indisputable statements and are represented by predicates. We only
use a propositional language. Facts containing free variables are interpreted as
the set of their variable-free instances. For example, “the price of the spam filter
is $50” is represented by Price(SpamFilter , 50).
A rule, on the other hand, describes the relationship between a set of lit-
erals (premises) and a literal (conclusion), and we can specify how strong the
relationship is. As usual, rules allow us to derive new conclusions given a set
of premises. As far as the strength of rules is concerned we distinguish between
strict rules, defeasible rules and defeaters.
Strict rules, defeasible rules and defeaters are represented, respectively, by
expressions of the form A1, . . . , An → B, A1, . . . , An ⇒ B and A1, . . . , An ; B,
where A1, . . . , An is a possibly empty set of prerequisites and B is the conclu-
sion of the rule. We only consider rules that are essentially propositional. Rules
containing free variables are interpreted as the set of their ground instances.
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are indis-
putable then so is the conclusion. Thus they can be used for definitional clauses.
An example of a strict rule is “A ‘Premium Customer’ is a customer who has
spent $10,000 on goods”:
TotalExpense(x, 10000)→ PremiumCustomer(x).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example
of such a rule is “Premium Customer are entitled to a 5% discount”:
PremiumCustomer(x)⇒ Discount(x).
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The idea is that if we know that someone is a Premium Customer, then we
may conclude that she is entitled to a discount unless there is other evidence
suggesting that she may not be (for example if she buys a good in promotion).
Defeaters are a special kind of rules. They are used to prevent conclusions
not to support them. For example:
SpecialOrder(x ),PremiumCustomer(x) ; ¬Surcharge(x).
This rule states that premium customers placing special orders might be ex-
empt from the special order surcharge. This rule can prevent the derivation of a
“surcharge” conclusion. On the other hand it cannot be used to support a “not
surcharge” conclusion.
DL is a “skeptical” non-monotonic logic, meaning that it does not support
contradictory conclusions. Instead DL seeks to resolve conflicts. In cases where
there is some support for concluding A but also support for concluding ¬A, DL
does not conclude either of them (thus the name “skeptical”). If the support for
A has priority over the support for ¬A then A is concluded.
As we have alluded to above, no conclusion can be drawn from conflicting
rules in DL unless these rules are prioritised. The superiority relation among rules
is used to define priorities among rules, that is, where one rule may override the
conclusion of another rule. For example, given the defeasible rules
r : PremiumCustomer(x)⇒ Discount(x)
r′ : SpecialOrder(x)⇒ ¬Discount(x)
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether
a Premium Customer who has placed a special order is entitled to the 5% dis-
count. But if we introduce a superiority relation > with r′ > r, then we can
indeed conclude that special orders are not subject to discount.
Informally, conclusions can be drawn in DL according to the following intu-
tion. Let D be a theory in DL (i.e., a collection of facts, rules and a superiority
relation over the set of rules). A conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can have
one of the following four forms:
+∆q meaning that q is definitely provable in D (i.e., using only facts and strict
rules).
−∆q meaning that we have proved that q is not definitely provable in D.
+∂q meaning that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂q meaning that we have proved that q is not defeasibly provable in D.
Strict derivations are obtained by forward chaining of strict rules, while a
defeasible conclusion p can be derived if there is a rule whose conclusion is p,
whose prerequisites (antecedent) have either already been proved or given in
the case at hand (i.e., facts), and any stronger rule whose conclusion is ¬p has
prerequisites that fail to be derived. In other words, a conclusion p is derivable
when:
– p is a fact; or
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– there is an applicable strict or defeasible rule for p, and either
• all the rules for ¬p are discarded (i.e., not applicable) or
• every applicable rule for ¬p is weaker than an applicable strict3 or de-
feasible rule for p.
In the next sections we will see how the basic machinery of DL can be extended
to deal with the multi-modal logic required to model BIO agents.
3.2 Modal Defeasible Logic
Our purpose is to account for policy-based motivations of BIO agents, which
requires to capture at least some basic facets of the modal notions of belief,
intention, and obligation.
Usually modal logics are extensions of classical propositional logic with some
intensional operators. Thus any modal logic should account for two components:
(1) the underlying logical structure of the propositional base and (2) the logic
behaviour of the modal operators. Alas, as is well-known, classical propositional
logic is not well suited to deal with real life scenarios. The main reason is that the
descriptions of real-life cases are, very often, partial and somewhat unreliable.
Our discussion in Section 2 is in line with this intution as far as agents’ mo-
tivational attitudes are concerned. Accordingly, in such circumstances classical
propositional logic might produce counterintuitive results insofar as it requires
complete, consistent and reliable information. Hence any modal logic based on
classical propositional logic is doomed to suffer from the same problems.
On the other hand the logic should specify how modalities can be introduced
and manipulated. Some common rules for modalities are, e.g.,
` ϕ
` 2ϕ Necessitation
` ϕ ⊃ ψ
` 2ϕ ⊃ 2ψ RM
Both dictates conditions to introduce modalities based purely on the derivability
and structure of the antecedent. These inference rules are related to the men-
tioned problem of logical omniscience: if 2 corresponds either to INT, BEL, or
OBL, they put unrealistic assumptions on the cognitive capabilities of an agent.
In effect, although some aspects of the expected side-effects problem should be
accepted in modelling rational agents, rules such as Necessitation and RM are
clearly too demanding: both in general permit to derive that an agent believes
or intends something, or that something is obligatory for her, assuming that
she knows all the truths defined by her logic, or that the logic that depicts her
behaviour automatically includes all the logical truths of classical logic, or that
she knows all the logical consequences of known propositions.
The point is thus avoid these difficulties by only admitting the side effects
for which no contrary reason can be advanced. Our strategy is twofold. First,
we take a constructive interpretation of 2: we have that if an agent can build
3 Notice that a strict rule can be defeated only when its antecedent is defeasibly
provable.
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a derivation of ϕ then she can build a derivation of 2ϕ. We want to maintain
this intuition, but also to replace derivability in classical logic with a practical
and feasible notion like derivability in DL. Thus the intuition behind this work
is that we are allowed to derive 2p if we can prove p with the mode 2 in DL.
To extend DL with modal operators we have two options: 1) to use the
same inferential mechanism as basic DL and to represent explicitly the modal
operators in the conclusion of rules [27]; 2) introduce new types of rules for the
modal operators to differentiate between modal and factual rules.
For example the “deontic” statement “The Purchaser shall follow the Sup-
plier price lists” can be represented as
AdvertisedPrice(X)⇒ OBLpurchaserPay(X)
if we follow the first option and
AdvertisedPrice(X)⇒OBLpurchaser Pay(X)
according to the second option, where ⇒OBLpurchaser denotes a new type of defea-
sible rule relative to the modal operator OBLpurchaser .
The differences between the two approaches, besides the fact that in the
first approach there is only one type of rules while the second accounts for
factual and modal rules, is that the first approach has to introduce an additional
machinery for introducing and reasoning with modal operators. Hence, explicitly
representing the modal operators in the conclusion of rules does not follow the
basic intution we have suggested above. In fact, in this case we would have to
provide a definition of p-incompatible literals (i.e., a set of literals that cannot
be hold when p holds.) for every literal p. For example we can have a modal
logic where 2p and ¬p cannot be both true at the same time. Moreover the
first approach is less flexible than the second: in particular in some cases it must
account for rules to derive 3p from 2p; similarly conversions –which permit to
use a rule for a certain modality as it were for another modality (see infra)–
require additional operational rules in a theory, thus the second approach seems
to offer a more conceptual tool than the first one. It seems that the second
approach can use different proof conditions based on the modal rules to offer a
more fine grained control over the modal operators and it allows for interaction
between modal operators.
If we label the arrows of the rules (i.e., agent’s policies) of our rule-based
system by the different modalities we want to deal with, then this solution
leads to distinguishing different modes through which the literals can be de-
rived using rules. How such types of derivation are related to the introduc-
tion of the corresponding modalised literals can be expressed as follows: if
X ∈ {BEL, INT,OBL}, then
Γ Γ ⇒X ψ
Γ |∼Xψ MI
As we will see, we do make an exception when rules for belief are concerned since
we will state that X ∈ {INT,OBL}. The reason for this is that we assume that
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beliefs are conceived of as the knowledge the agent has of the enviroment, and
so they are used by the agent to make inferences about how the world is: in this
perspective, belief conclusions correspond to factual knowledge and do not need
to be modalised. But besides this exception, which can be removed if required,
schema MI captures the basic logical behaviour of our modal rules.
So far, so good. However, if nothing is done besides labelling the rules of DL,
what we have in our hands is nothing but a simple treatment of modalities: what
we obtain is that the conditions for introducing modalities (and in particular
intentions and obligations) collapse into those for deriving literals in standard
DL. Hence, the next step is to allow the consequence relations to interact with
the propositional module and with each other. Indeed, we could in theory define
sets of many interaction patterns, but what we need for the purposes of our
paper are only two interaction strategies: one that permits to use rules for a
modality X as they were for another modality Y (rule conversions), and one
that considers conflicts between rules (conflict-detection and conflict-resolution).
Rule Conversions The notion of rule conversion allows us to model peculiar
interactions between different modal operators. In general, notice that in many
formalisms it is possible to convert from one type of conclusion into a different
one. Take for example the right weakening rule of non-monotonic consequence
relations (see, for example [28])
B ` C A |∼B
A |∼ C
which allows the combination of non-monotonic and classical consequences.
Suppose that a rule of a specific type is given and also suppose that all the
literals in the antecedent of a rule are provable in one and the same modality. If
so, is it possible to argue that the conclusion of the rule inherits the modality of
the antecedent? To give an example, suppose we have that ψ ⇒BEL φ and that
we derive ψ using a rule labelled by INT. Can we conclude INTφ? If the answer
is positive, on the basis of MI this can be represented as follows:
Γ |∼ INTψ ψ ⇒BEL φ
Γ, INTψ |∼ INTφ Conversion
In many cases this is a reasonable conclusion to obtain. Indeed, this is the infer-
ence pattern we discussed in Section 2: if an agent believes to visit Italy if she
visits Rome, and she has the intention to visit Rome, then it seems rational that
she has the intention to visit Italy. Thus, conversions are ways through which
some rational side effects can be derived. An additional example can help us
illustrate the notion of conversion. Consider the following formalisation of the
Yale Shooting Problem.4
load live ammo, shoot⇒BEL kill
4 Here we will ignore all temporal aspects and we will assume that the sequence of
actions is done in the correct order.
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This rule encodes the knowledge of an agent that knows that loading the gun
with live ammunitions, and then shooting will kill her friend. This example
clearly shows that the qualification of the conclusions depends on the modalities
relative to the individual acts “load” and “shoot”. In particular, if we obtain
that the agent intends to load and to shoot the gun (INT(load), INT(shoot)),
then, since she knows that the consequence of these actions is the death of her
friend, she intends to kill him. However, if shooting was not intended, then we
have prima facie to say that killing, too, was not intentional.
To define the admitted conversions we introduce a binary relation Convert
over the modalities of the language. When we write Convert(BEL, INT) this
means that a belief rule r can be used to derive an intention (of course, provided
that all its antecedents are derived as intentions): r can thus be converted into
a rule for intention. Notice that we do not impose any specific constraint on
Convert. In particular, we do not require Convert to be irreflexive. In fact, rule
conversions can be viewed as corresponding, in a multi-modal setting, to the
following inference schema:
Xψ Y (ψ → φ)
Xφ
(3)
If we have Convert(X,Y ) and X = Y , we do not obtain something necessar-
ily odd. As is well-known, in deontic logic, for example, this inference pattern
corresponds to the so-called deontic detachment:
OBLψ OBL(ψ → φ)
OBLφ
(4)
Although (4) is far from being uncontroversial, it seems that the same philo-
sophical reasons that lead to accept it may support, for example, the adoption
of its counterpart for intentions. Thus, even though we do not want in general
to accept (3) when X = Y , we believe that this case cannot be excluded, and
so, a fortiori, that Convert(X,X) be always rejected.
Conflicts As was mentioned in the previous sections, conflict-detection and
conflict-resolution play an important role in the current context. It is in fact
crucial to establish criteria for detecting and solving conflicts between the differ-
ent components which characterise the cognitive profiles of agent’s deliberation.
In a multi-modal setting, we can establish which modalities can be incompatible
with each other, and, also, we can impose various forms of consistency, such as
the following:
Xφ→ ¬Y ¬φ (5)
(Xφ ∧ Y ¬φ)→ ¬Z¬φ (6)
Criteria for conflict-detection and -resolution in DL can capture the rationale
of schemata such as (5) and (6). However, their precise definition makes it neces-
sary to take care of the peculiar approach adopted. In particular, various forms
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of consistency between agents’ motivations require to define incompatibility re-
lations between the modalities by referring to rule types as well as to specific
methods to solve conflicts between the rules. Many complex conflict patterns can
be identified [5,7,6]. For the purpose of this paper, we introduce a binary and
asymmetric relation Conflict over the set of modalities that defines which types
of rules are in conflict and which are the stronger ones (the formal definition of
Conflict is given in Section 3.3). Suppose, for example, that we have
r : a⇒BEL q
s : b⇒OBL ¬q
t : c⇒INT q
If we only have Conflict(BEL,OBL), this means that rule r is in conflict with
rule s and that r is stronger than s: for this reason, if applicable, r will defeat s.
Suppose now to drop r. Nothing is said about the relation bewteen obligations
and intentions, and so about rules s and t. This means that there is no incom-
patibility relation between INT and OBL and we are free to derive both INTq
and OBL¬q.
The relation Conflict is explicitly linked to that of agent type. Classically,
agent types are characterised by stating conflict resolution types in terms of
orders of overruling between rules [4,5,7,6]. In this perspective, agent types are
meaningful within a non-monotonic setting and are nothing but general strate-
gies to detect and solve conflicts between the different components of the cogni-
tive profiles of agent’s deliberation. In [4] 24 possible types are identified while,
in [6], based on a different framework, 20 combinations are proposed. Typically,
rational agents are assumed to be at least realistic: a realistic agent, in fact, is
such that rules for beliefs override all other components, as beliefs correspond to
agent’s account of how the environment is. If the realistic condition is abandoned,
we may have situations where intentions and desires override beliefs, thus leading
to various forms of wishful thinking. Given the minimal assumption that a ra-
tional agent should be realistic, we may further constrain agent’s deliberation in
order not to violate obligations: a social agent type requires that obligations are
stronger than the other motivational components with the exception of beliefs.
Other agent types can be specified, for which see Section 4.
3.3 The Language of Modal Defeasible Logic
The inference process derives factual knowledge (through belief rules), inten-
tions and obligations based on existing facts, intentions and obligations. Thus,
rules allow for the derivation of new motivational factors of an agent. As was
mentioned, we divide the rules into rules for beliefs, intentions, and obligations.
Provability for beliefs does not generate modalised literals, since in our view
beliefs concern the knowledge an agent has about the world and corresponds to
the basic infernce mechanism of the agent.
A defeasible agent theory consists of a set of facts or indisputable statements,
three sets of rules for beliefs, intentions, and obligations, a set of conversions
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saying when a rule of one type can be used also as another type, a set of conflict
relations saying when two rule types can be in conflict and which rule type
prevails, and a superiority relation > among rules saying when a single rule may
override the conclusion of another rule. For X ∈ {BEL, INT,OBL}, we have that
φ1, . . . , φn →X ψ is a strict rule such that whenever the premises φ1, . . . , φn are
indisputable so is the conclusion ψ. φ1, . . . , φn ⇒X ψ is a defeasible rule that
can be defeated by contrary evidence. φ1, . . . , φn ;X ψ is a defeater that is
used to defeat some defeasible rules by producing evidence to the contrary. It is
worth noting that modalised literals can occur only in the antecedent of rules:
the reason of this is that the rules are used to derive modalised conclusions
while we do not conceptually need to iterate modalities. This limitation makes
the system more manageable.
Definition 1 (Language). Let PROP be a set of propositional atoms, MOD =
{BEL, INT,OBL} be the set of modal operators, and Lab be a set of labels. The
sets below are the smallest sets closed under the following rules:
Literals
Lit = PROP ∪ {¬p|p ∈ PROP}
If q is a literal, ∼q denotes the complementary literal (if q is a positive literal
p then ∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then ∼q is p);
Modal literals
ModLit = {Xl,¬Xl|l ∈ Lit, X ∈ {INT,OBL}};
Rules Rule = Rules ∪ Ruled ∪ Ruledft , where for X ∈ MOD
Rules = {r : φ1, . . . , φn →X ψ|
r ∈ Lab, A(r) ⊆ Lit ∪ModLit, ψ ∈ Lit}
Ruled = {r : φ1, . . . , φn ⇒X ψ|
r ∈ Lab, A(r) ⊆ Lit ∪ModLit, ψ ∈ Lit}
Ruledft = {r : φ;X ψ|
r ∈ Lab, A(r) ⊆ Lit ∪ModLit, ψ ∈ Lit}
We use some obvious abbreviations, such as superscript for mental attitude,
subscript for type of rule, and Rule[φ] for rules whose consequent is φ, for
example:
RuleBEL = {r : φ1, . . . , φn BEL ψ|
(r : φ1, . . . , φn BEL ψ) ∈ Rule, ∈ {→,⇒,;}}
Rules[ψ] = {φ1, . . . , φn →X ψ|
{φ1, . . . , φn} ⊆ Lit ∪ModLit, ψ ∈ Lit, X ∈ MOD}
We use A(r) to denote the set {φ1, . . . , φn} of antecedents of the rule r, and
C(r) to denote the consequent ψ of the rule r.
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Definition 2 (Conversion and Conflict Relations). The conversion rela-
tion Convert is defined as follows:
Convert ⊆ MOD×MOD
The conflict relation Conflict ⊆ MOD×MOD is such that
∀X,Y ∈ MOD, Conflict(X,Y )⇒ ¬(Conflict(Y,X))(asymmetry)
Definition 3 (Defeasible Agent Theory). A defeasible agent theory is a
structure
D = (F,RBEL, RINT, ROBL, >, C,V)
where
– F ⊆ Lit ∪ModLit is a finite set of facts;
– RBEL ⊆ RuleBEL, RINT ⊆ RuleINT, ROBL ⊆ RuleOBL are three finite sets of
rules such that each rule has a unique label;
– The superiority relation > is such that >=>st ∪ >Conflict, where >st⊆ RX×
RX such that if r > s, then if r ∈ RuleX [p] then s ∈ RuleX [∼p] and > is
acyclic; and >Conflict is such that
∀r ∈ RuleX [p],∀s ∈ RuleY [∼p], if Conflict(X,Y ), then r >Conflict s
– C ⊆ {Convert(X,Y )|X,Y ∈ MOD} is a set of conversions;
– V ⊆ {Conflict(X,Y )|X,Y ∈ MOD} is a set of conflict relations.
The following running example illustrates the defeasible agent theory.
Example 1 (Running example). Frodo, our Tolkienian agent, is entrusted
by Elrond to be the bearer of the ring of power, a ring forged by the dark lord
Sauron. Frodo has the task to bring the ring to Mordor, the realm of Sauron,
and to destroy it by throwing it into the fires of Mount Doom. However, Frodo
loves the place where he was born, the Shire, and intends to go there.
F = {INTGoToShire, EntrustedByElrond}
R = {r1 : EntrustedByElrond ⇒BEL RingBearer
r2 : RingBearer ⇒OBL DestroyRing
r3 : INTGoToShire ⇒INT ¬GoToMordor
r4 : ¬GoToMordor ⇒BEL ¬DestroyRing}
>= {r4 > r2}
C = {Convert(BEL, INT)}
V = {Conflict(BEL,OBL)}
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3.4 Inferences with BIO Agents
Proofs are sequences of literals and modal literals together with so-called proof
tags +∆, −∆, +∂ and −∂. Given a defeasible agent theory D, +∆Xq means
that literal q is provable in D using only facts and strict rules for modality X,
−∆Xq means that it has been proved in D that q is not definitely provable in
D, +∂Xq means that q is defeasibly provable in D, and −∂Xq means that it has
been proved in D that q is not defeasibly provable in D.
Definition 4. Given an agent theory D, a proof in D is a linear derivation,
i.e, a sequence of labelled formulas of the type +∆Xq, −∆Xq, +∂Xq and −∂Xq,
where the proof conditions defined in the rest of this section hold.
We start with some terminology. As was explained, the following definition
states the special status of belief rules, and that the introduction of a modal
operator corresponds to being able to derive the associated literal using the
rules for the modal operator.
Definition 5. Let # ∈ {∆, ∂}, and P = (P (1), . . . , P (n)) be a proof in D. A
(modal) literal q is #-provable in P if there is a line P (m) of P such that either
1. q is a literal and P (m) = +#BELq or
2. q is a modal literal Xp and P (m) = +#Xp or
3. q is a modal literal ¬Xp and P (m) = −#Xp.
A literal q is #-rejected in P if there is a line P (m) of P such that
1. q is a literal and P (m) = −#BELq or
2. q is a modal literal Xp and P (m) = −#Xp or
3. q is a modal literal ¬Xp and P (m) = +#Xp.
The definition of ∆X describes just forward chaining of strict rules:
+∆X : If P (n+ 1) = +∆Xq then
(1) q ∈ F if X = BEL or Xq ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ RXs [q] : ∀a ∈ A(r) a is ∆-provable or
(3) ∃r ∈ RYs [q] : Convert(Y,X) ∈ C, ∀a ∈ A(r) Xa is ∆-provable.
−∆X : If P (n+ 1) = −∆Xq then
(1) q /∈ F if X = BEL and Xq /∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ RXs [q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : a is ∆-rejected and
(3) ∀r ∈ RYs [q] : if Convert(Y,X) ∈ C then ∃a ∈ A(r) Xa is ∆-rejected.
For a literal q to be definitely provable with the mode X we need to find a
strict rule for X with head q, whose antecedents have all been definitely proved
previously. And to establish that q cannot be definitely proven we must establish
that for every strict rule with head q there is at least one antecedent which has
been shown to be non-provable. Condition (3) says that a rule for Y can be
used as a rule for a different modal operator X in case all literals in the body of
the rule are modalised with the modal operator we want to prove. For example,
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given the rule p, q →BEL s, we can derive +∆INTs if we have +∆INTp, +∆INTq,
and the conversion Convert(BEL, INT) holds in the theory.
Conditions for ∂X are more complicated. We define when a rule is applicable
or discarded. A rule for a belief is applicable if all the literals in the antecedent of
the rule are provable with the appropriate modalities, while the rule is discarded
if at least one of the literals in the antecedent is not provable. As before, for the
other types of rules we have to take conversions into account. We have thus to
determine conditions under which a rule for Y can be used to directly derive a
literal q modalised by X. Roughly, the condition is that all the antecedents a of
the rule are such that +∂Xa.
Definition 6. Given a derivation P , P (1..n) denotes the initial part of the
derivation of length n. Let X,Y, Z ∈ MOD.
– A rule r ∈ Rsd is applicable in the proof condition for ±∂X iff
1. r ∈ RX and ∀a ∈ A(r), +∂BELa ∈ P (1..n) and
∀Za ∈ A(r), +∂Za ∈ P (1..n), or
2. r ∈ RY , Convert(Y,X) ∈ C, and ∀a ∈ A(r), +∂Xa ∈ P (1..n).
– A rule r is discarded in the condition for ±∂X iff
1. r ∈ RX and ∃a ∈ A(r) such that −∂BELa ∈ P (1..n) or ∃Za ∈ A(r) such
that −∂Za ∈ P (1..n); or
2. r ∈ RY and, if Convert(Y,X), then ∃a ∈ A(r) such that −∂Xa ∈
P (1..n), or
3. r ∈ RZ and either ¬Convert(Z,X) or ¬Conflict(Z,X).
Example 2 The rule a, INTb⇒BEL c is applicable if we can prove both +∂BELa
and +∂INTb.
Example 3 If we have a type of agent that allows a deontic rule to be converted
into a rule for intention, Convert(OBL, INT), then the definition of applicable
in the condition for ±∂INT is as follows: a rule r ∈ Rsd[q] is applicable iff (1)
r ∈ RINT and ∀a ∈ A(r), +∂BELa ∈ P (1..n) and ∀Xa ∈ A(r), +∂Xa ∈ P (1..n),
(2) or r ∈ ROBL and ∀a ∈ A(r), +∂INTa ∈ P (1..n). In this second case, for
example, given the rule p, q ⇒OBL s, we can derive +∂INTs if we have +∂INTp
and +∂INTq.
As a corollary of the definition of applicability, we can establish when a literal
is supported (see Section 5.2 for the use of this notion):
Definition 7. Given a theory D, a literal l is supported in D iff there exists a
rule r ∈ R[l] such that r is applicable, otherwise l is not supported. For X ∈ MOD
we use +ΣX l and −ΣX l to indicate that l is supported / not supported by rules
for X.
We are now ready to provide proof conditions for ±∂X :
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+∂X : If P (n+ 1) = +∂Xq then
(1)+∆Xq ∈ P (1..n) or
(2) (2.1) −∆X∼q ∈ P (1..n) and
(2.2) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] such that r is applicable, and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either s is discarded, or
(2.3.1) ∃t ∈ R[q] such that t is applicable and t > s, and either
t, s ∈ RZ , or Convert(Y,X) and r ∈ RY
−∂X : If P (n+ 1) = −∂Xq then
(1) −∆Xq ∈ P (1..n) and either
(2.1) +∆X∼q ∈ P (1..n) or
(2.2) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q], either r is discarded, or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q], such that s is applicable, and
(2.3.1) ∀t ∈ R[q] either t is discarded, or t 6> s, or
t, s 6∈ RZ and, if r ∈ RY then ¬Convert(Y,X).
To show that q is defeasibly provable we have two choices: (1) We show that q
is already definitely provable; or (2) we need to argue using the defeasible part
of a theory D. For this second case, three (sub)conditions must be satisfied.
First, we require that there must be a strict or defeasible rule for q which can be
applied (2.1). Second, we need to consider possible reasoning chains in support
of ∼q, and show that ∼q is not definitely provable (2.2). Third, we must consider
the set of all rules which are not known to be inapplicable and which permit
to get ∼q (2.3). Essentially, each such a rule s attacks the conclusion q. For q
to be provable, s must be counterattacked by a rule t for q with the following
properties: (i) t must be applicable, and (ii) t must be stronger than s. Thus
each attack on the conclusion q must be counterattacked by a stronger rule. In
other words, r and the rules t form a team (for q) that defeats the rules s. −∂Xq
is defined in an analogous manner.
Example 4 (Running example; continued). Below is the set C of all con-
clusions we get using the rules in R:
C = {RingBearer , INT¬GoToMordor , INT¬DestroyRing}
As facts, we know that Frodo has the primitive intention to go to the Shire
and that he has been entrusted by Elrond. These facts make applicable rules r3
and r1, which permit to derive that Frodo is the ring bearer and that he has
the intention not to go to Mordor. At this point we have a conflict, as we have
Conflict(BEL,OBL) and Convert(BEL, INT). In effect, given the conversion, r4
permits to derive that Frodo has the intention not to destroy the ring while rule
r2 should lead to the obligation to destroy it. However, r4 is stronger than r2
and so we only get +∂INT¬DestroyRing .
4 Agent Types
Classically, agent types are characterized by stating conflict resolution types in
terms of orders of overruling between rules [4,5]. For example, an agent is realistic
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when rules for beliefs override all other components; she is social when obliga-
tions are stronger than the other motivational components with the exception
of beliefs, etc.
As suggested in [7,6], agent types can be characterised in DL as follows:
Definition 8 (Agent Type (1)). An agent type is defined by a set of pairs
(X,Y ), X,Y ∈ {BEL,OBL, INT}, such that for every r and r′ such that r ∈
RX [q] and r′ ∈ RY [∼q], we have that r > r′.
For example, while realistic agents are such thatX = BEL and Y ∈ {INT,OBL},
social agents are such that X = OBL and Y = INT. It is clear that the notion
of agent type is defined in terms of the relation Conflict we have previously
introduced.
Let us see the agent types that can be identified in the framework we have
defined so far. Table 1 shows all possible cases and, for each kind of rule, indicates
all attacks on it. It should be read as follows. Each of the three main columns
identifies a possible kind of conflict between two types X,Y of applicable rules
that would permit to infer the literals p and ∼p labelled by X and Y respectively.
The first row from the top in the three main columns specifies the case where
both literals are derived (i.e., there is no conflict, which indeed corresponds to
the case where the modalities involved are not in Conflict); the second and third
rows from top identify the cases where we have a conflict and one rule prevails
over the other. The third sub-column in each main column defines the agent
type for which each conflict-detection and -resolution policy is appropriate. (To
save space, in Table 1 “indep.” abbreviates “independent”, “wish. th.” “wishful
thinking”, and “real.” “realistic”.)
⇒OBL p / ⇒INT ∼p ⇒OBL p / ⇒BEL ∼p ⇒INT p / ⇒BEL ∼p
+∂OBLp +∂INT∼p indep. +∂OBLp +∂BEL∼p wish. th. +∂INTp +∂BEL∼p wish. th.
+∂OBLp −∂INT∼p social +∂OBLp −∂BEL∼p wish. th. +∂INTp −∂BELp wish. th.
−∂OBLp +∂INT∼p deviant −∂OBLp +∂BEL∼p real. −∂INTp +∂BEL∼p real.
Table 1. Conflict: Agent Types
Independent agents are free to adopt intentions for p in presence of deriva-
tions for OBL∼p. This is possible in our framework when we have that
¬Conflict(OBL, INT) and ¬Conflict(INT,OBL): this means that the system
admits both conclusions, as they are not in conflict. As expected, for social
agents obligations override intentions and so Conflict(OBL, INT); the opposite
case is when an agent is deviant and her intentions override the obligations,
Conflict(INT,OBL). Where beliefs are defeated either by obligations or by in-
tentions we have classical examples of wishful thinking. Notice that in Table 1
also the cases +∂OBLp/+∂BEL∼p and +∂INTp/+∂BEL∼p have been classified as
wishful thinking, given the basic nature of beliefs we adopted in our framework.
However, we are aware that this reading is debatable: in effect, if we can derive
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both conclusions, this means that there is no real conflict. Last, it is worth not-
ing that we do not consider here the case where −∂Xp/− ∂Y∼p: here we would
have that X and Y are incompatible, but that it is not possible to establish
what rule is the strongest one, thus leading to a mutual defeating of the rules
involved. This case –which is discussed in [5,7,6] and permits to identify other
agent types– is excluded here, as the relation Conflict both identifies conflicts
and solves them by establishing what rule type must prevail.
It is possible to integrate the above classifications by referring to the notion
of conversion. Conversions do not have a direct relation with conflict resolution
because they simply affect the condition of applicability of rules. However, they
indeed contribute to define the cognitive profile of agents because they allow to
obtain conclusions modalised by a certain X through the application of rules
which are not modalised by X. Table 2 shows the conversions and specify new
agent types with respect to which each conversion seems to be appropriate.
Convert(BEL,OBL) c-realistic Convert(INT,OBL) c-deviant
Convert(BEL, INT) c-realistic Convert(OBL,BEL) NO
Convert(OBL, INT) c-social Convert(INT,BEL) NO
Table 2. Conversions
A preliminary remark before commenting Table 2. We do not consider here
conversions Convert(X,Y ) where X = Y . In fact, even though they can be ad-
mitted, they do not seem to characterise a specific cognitive profile for the agents.
Consider Convert(BEL,OBL) and Convert(BEL, INT). Both seem appropriate
for some types of realistic agent. Indeed, for a realistic agent beliefs correspond
to her basic reasoning mechanism. Accordingly, if we have
r : ¬open umbrella ⇒BEL wet
+∂INT¬open umbrella +∂OBL¬open umbrella
it is reasonable to derive both that the agent has the intention to be wet, and
that it is obligatory for her to be wet.
Other conversions look more appropriate for other agent types. For example,
we may have agent types for which Convert(OBL, INT) holds. This means that
from
r : kill ⇒OBL kill gently +∂INTkill
we can derive that the agent has the intention to kill gently. But this derivation
is conceptually meaningful only if we assume a kind of norm regimentation, by
which we impose that all agents intend what is prescribed by deontic rules.
The peculiarity of Convert(INT,OBL) is that the simple fact that something
is derived as obligatory can permit to obtain through a rule for intention that
something else is obligatory as well. Consider this case:
r : help needy people ⇒INT save money +∂OBLhelp needy people
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If Convert(INT,OBL) holds, then we can derive that it is obligatory for the
agent to save money: an intention supports the derivation of an obligation. In
other papers [5], this case has been classified as an example of an agent legislator.
Here, we prefer to consider it as a case of a deviant agent [6], due to its structural
similarity to Conflict(INT,OBL).
Finally, notice that the conversions Convert(OBL,BEL) and
Convert(INT,BEL), which are marked in the table by a “NO”, seem meaning-
less. They say that a rule for obligation and for intention may respectively be
used to derive a belief. This sounds odd, at least adopting the interpretation
of beliefs of this paper. In fact, since the belief modality captures the basic
knoweledge the agent has about the environment, it is treated as its logic were
reflexive (namely, that BELψ → ψ holds). Consider, for example, the following:
r : help needy people ⇒INT save money +∂BELhelp needy people
If Convert(INT,BEL) holds, then we obtain that the agent in fact saves
money, which is odd: beliefs, according to our interpretation should be inde-
pendent from agent’s deliberation, even though they are used to derive motiva-
tional attitudes such as intentions and obligations. In addition, adopting both
Convert(OBL,BEL) and Convert(INT,BEL) would determine a collapse of our
logic, as we could dispense with explicit modalities in the antecedent of rules.
Since our logic system is characterised by Conflict as well as by Convert, and
conversions indeed contribute to define the cognitive profile of an agent, it seems
that an agent type should take both parameters into account:
Definition 9 (Agent Type (2)). An agent type is defined by a pair (Γ,∆),
where Γ ⊆ {Conflict(X,Y )|X,Y ∈ MOD} and ∆ ⊆ {Convert(Z,W )|Z,W ∈
MOD}.
It is easy to see that the notion of agent type of Definition 8 (proposed in [7,6])
is captured by Definition 9.
This completes our picture of the notion of agent types. However, a serious
difficulty is around the corner when we focus on the notion of agent type based
on defining criteria for conflict-detection and -resolution. Are we sure that this
view is sufficient, given the account of policy-based attitudes we previously dis-
cussed? In the reminder we will consider only the interaction between intentions
and obligations, event though similar remarks can be easily extended to all other
agent types presented in Table 1. But, even confining the problem to these com-
ponents, the question at stake is: How to deal with social agents? The simplest
solution is the classical one, corresponding to adopting schema (5) and that we
have adopted so far: when we have two rules, one leading to INTφ and the other
to OBL¬φ, the former is blocked. As we shall see, this strategy is not enough.
5 Social Agents
5.1 The Problem
The idea of social agent based on the intuition of Definition 8–which is also
adopted in [4]– does not guarantee that agent’s deliberation is oriented to fully
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complying with obligations. The same holds when Definition 9 is used. In effect,
to our view a social agent can be defined by the following pair
({Conflict(BEL, INT),Conflict(BEL,OBL),Conflict(OBL, INT)},
{Convert(BEL,OBL),Convert(BEL, INT)})
according to which the agent is realistic (beliefs override the other components,
and the appropriate conversions hold) and obligations prevail over conflicting
intentions.
In both cases, the drawback is mainly due to the introduction of conversions.
Since conversions allow to obtain conclusions modalised by a certain X through
the application of rules which are not modalised by X, they are fundamental
in order to capture the fact that some side-effects should be accepted insofar as
they are consequences of policies of which the agent is aware. Moreover, some
conversions seem useful to integrate the basic idea of social agency.
It is clear that our system admits three different types of intentions and obli-
gations. First, we have primitive intentions and obligations when these are facts
of the theory. But we can also have what we may call primary and secondary
intentions and obligations, depending on whether we accept at least basic con-
versions via belief rules.
Let us consider Example 1. INTGoToShire is a primitive intention. On
the other hand, OBLDestroyRing –if it were derived from rule r2– and
INT¬GoToMordor are primary obligations and intentions as they would
be obtained without the use of conversions (see Example 4). Finally,
INT¬DestroyRing is a secondary intention because it is obtained from the rule
r4 : ¬GoToMordor ⇒BEL ¬DestroyRing and from +∂INT¬GoToMordor (again,
see Example 4). It should be noted that OBLDestroyRing cannot be derived
because r4 > r2, but this just amounts to assuming that the agent is realistic:
r4 is a belief rule whereas r2 is a deontic rule. In other words, when we have in
general that
a⇒OBL q b⇒BEL ∼q
+∂BELa +∂INTb
we are doomed to have social agents who cannot be truly social since some of
their (primitive) intentions lead to behaviours against what would be otherwise
obligatory for the agents. However, this issue is not a matter of a direct conflict
between rules for intentions and obligations. Thus, to deal with norm-complying
agents in these scenarios and to restore their sociality we are required to change
the notion of agent type. We cannot anymore define it in terms of an order of
overruling between rules, but we have to focus on how the conflicting literals are
derived during the proof. Indeed, this is feasible, but has a high computational
cost, and even then we cannot guarantee the sociality of an agent.
5.2 The Cost of Social Agents
In this section we investigate the complexity of the defeasible logic for BIO agents
where we assume the conversions Convert(BEL,OBL) and Convert(BEL, INT)
Norms, Beliefs, Intentions in Defeasible Logic 23
and then we turn our attention to the complexity of social agents. We first
introduce some notions to make precise the definition of the issues at hand.
Definition 10. Let # be one of the proof tags. Given a theory D, D ` ±#p iff
there is a derivation P in D such that for some n P (n) = ±#p.
Definition 11. Given a theory D, the universe of D (UD) is the set of all the
atoms occurring in D; the extension of D (ED), is defined as follows:
ED = (∆+, ∆−, ∂+, ∂−)
where for X ∈ {BEL, INT,OBL}
∆+ = {Xl : D ` +∆X l};
∆− = {Xl : D ` −∆X l};
∂+ = {Xl : D ` +∂X l};
∂− = {Xl : D ` −∂X l}.
Two theories D and D′ are equivalent if and only if they have the same extension,
namely D ≡ D′ iff ED = ED′ .
We now prove the main theorem about the complexity of our defeasible
logic. We show that the logic has linear complexity if we compute the whole set
of conclusions, i.e., the extension, of a given theory.
Theorem 1. For every theory D, ED can be computed in time linear to the size
of the theory, i.e., O(|UD| ∗ |R|).
Proof. The proof is based on a modification of the algorithm given by Maher
[26] to show that propositional defeasible logic has linear complexity.
The main idea of the proof is to build appropriate data structure to im-
plement a series of transformations reducing the complexity of the rules, and
where each literal and modal literal is examined only once. The focal point of
the transformations is based on the following properties:
– Let D ` +∂p then
D ∪ {r : p1, . . . , pn, p⇒ q} ≡ D ∪ {r : p1, . . . , pn ⇒ q}.
– Let D ` −∂p then D ∪ {r : p1, . . . , pn, p⇒ q} ≡ D.
The properties allow us (1) to remove already proved literals from the body of
rules and (2) to remove rules which have been discarded.
The algorithm has three phases. (1) A pre-processing phase where we use
similar transformations to those given in [24] to transform a theory into an
equivalent theory without superiority relation and defeaters; the transformation
is linear. (2) A rule loader that parses the theory obtained in the first phase and
generates the data structure that encodes the theory. (3) The inference engine
applies transformations to the data structure, where at every step it reduces the
complexity of the data structure.
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(1) Transformations Theory transformations are an important tools to study
properties of defeasibly logic. In [24] we extensively used transformations to
show under which conditions it is possible to simplify the presentation of basic
defeasible logic by dispensing defeaters and the superiority relation. In what
follows we are going to give transformations that allow us to remove defeaters
and the superiority relation from modal defeasible theories for BIO agents.
Definition 12. Let # two modal defeasible theories D1 and D2 are equivalent
(written D1 ≡ D2) iff ∀p,D1 ` #p iff D2 ` #p, i.e., they have the same conse-
quences. Similarly D1 ≡Σ D2 means that D1 and D2 have the same consequences
in the language Σ.
Definition 13. A transformation is a mapping from modal defeasible theories
to modal defeasible theories. A transformation T is correct iff for all modal
defeasible theories D, D ≡Σ T (D) where Σ is the language of D.
Definition 14. Let A = {l1, . . . , ln} ⊆ Lit and X ∈ MOD, then XA = {Xli :
li ∈ A}.
Definition 15. Let D = (F,R,>) be a defeasible theory such that Rdft = ∅. Let
Σ be the language of D. Define elimsup(D) = (F,R′, ∅), where





elimsup(r) = {A(r) ↪→BEL ¬inf(r),¬inf(r) ↪→X C(r) : A(r) ↪→X C(r) ∈ Rsd}
For each rule r ∈ R, inf(r) is a new atom, i.e., they do not appear in Σ.
Furthermore all new atoms generated are distinct.
Theorem 2. The transformation elimsup is correct.
Proof. The proof by induction on the length of derivations is similar to that
given in [24]. Here we give in full the case of strict derivations and we outline
the main part of the case of defeasible derivations.
Case if D ` +∆Xp then elimsup(D) ` +∆Xp. For a proof of length 1 of
+∆Xp, i.e., P (1) = +∆Xp, then we have two cases: (1) Xp ∈ F , (2) ∃r ∈
RXs [p], A(r) = ∅. The first case is trivial since F is the same in D and elimsup(D).
For (2) we have that elimsup(D) contains the rules ra :→BEL ¬inf(r), and
rc : ¬inf(r) → p. ra is applicable, so we have +∆BEL¬inf(r), then this makes
rc applicable and then we have elimsup(D) ` +∆Xp.
For the inductive step, we assume as usual that the property holds for proofs
whose length is up to n, and than we consider P (n+1) = +∆Xp. Beside the cases
for the inductive base, we have two additional cases to consider here: (a) ∃r ∈
RXs [p],∀a ∈ A(r),+∆Y a ∈ P (1..n); (b) Convert(X,Y ) and ∃s ∈ RYs ,+∆Xa ∈
P (1..n).
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For (a) by inductive hypothesis, ∀a ∈ A(r), elimsup(D) ` +∆a, thus the
rule ra : A(r) →BEL ¬inf(r) is applicable, thus elimsup(D) ` +∆BEL¬inf(r),
which makes rule rc : ¬inf(r) →X p applicable as well, and we can conclude
elimsup(D) ` +∆Xp.
For (b) by inductive hypothesis ∀a ∈ A(r), elimsup(D) ` +∆Xa, thus we
can use the rule sa : A(r)→BEL ¬inf(s) to derive +∆X¬inf(s). Since we have
Convert(Y,X), we can apply conversion to the rule sc : ¬inf(s)→Y p to derive
elimsup(D) ` +∆Xp.
For the other direction, i.e., elimsup(D) ` +∆Xp (for p ∈ Σ) then D `
+∆Xp, the proof is again by induction on the length of derivations.
The inductive base is trivial since the only possible derivation for a modal
literal Xp in Σ is only when Xp ∈ F , and thus Xp is also a fact in D,
For the inductive bases, P (n + 1) = +∆Xp we have that for every literal
in Σ which is not a fact, ∃r ∈ R such that either (i) ¬inf(r) →X p or (ii)
¬inf(r)→Y p is in elimsup(D). In addition we have a rule A(r)→BEL ¬inf(r).
For (i) in the proof we have ∀a ∈ A(r),+∆a ∈ P (1..n), thus by inductive
hypothesis D ` +∆a, which makes applicable the rule r : A(r) →X p. For (ii)
to derive +∆Xp from ¬inf(r) →Y p, we must have +∆X¬inf(r) ∈ P (1..n),
which means that we have +∆Xa ∈ P (1..n) for all a ∈ A(r). Again by inductive
hypothesis we have D ` +∆Xa for all a ∈ A(r), and r is A(r) →Y p were
Convert(Y,X). Therefore D ` +∆Xp.
The proof for −∆X is analogous and uses the same ideas of conversion from
the case for +∆ and the basic structure from the proof for the transformation
that removes the superiority relation from [24].
The proof of the case for +∂ is essentially the same as that given in [24]. The
only difference is in the iterative construction of the sets of maximal applicable
rules, the existence of such sets is guaranteed by the clause of the proof conditions
saying t > s. If a rule r is maximal applicable then either ∀a ∈ A(r),+∂a
or ∀a ∈ A(r),+∂Xa (applicable condition), and there is no applicable rule s
such that s > r. Thus all rules ¬inf(s) ↪→BEL inf(r) are discarded while the
rule A(r) ↪→BEL ¬inf(r) is applicable, thus we prove either +∂BEL¬inf(r) or
+∂X¬inf(r). Thus every rule ¬inf(r) ⇒BEL inf(t), is applicable, this means
that we prove −∂Z¬inf(t) for all Z ∈ MOD. The main points here is that BEL
converts universally and that there are conflict between all pairs of modalities.
Accordingly the rule tc, attacking a rule for p is discarded. Using all rules in the
maximal applicable sets we can show that all rules attacking p are discarded,
and that we have at least one applicable rule for p. The proof for −∂ has the
same structure of that given in [24] for the same case and the construction just
outlined for the case +∂.
Definition 16. Let D = (F,R,> 0) be a modal defeasible theory, and Σ be the









{r+ : A(r) ↪→BEL p+, r− : A(r) ↪→BEL ¬p−,
r : p+ ↪→X p} r ∈ RXsd[p]
{r− : A(r) ↪→BEL p−, r+ : A(r) ↪→BEL ¬p+,
r : p− ↪→X ¬p} r ∈ RXsd[¬p]
{r : A(r)⇒BEL ¬p−} r ∈ Rdft [p]
{r : A(r)⇒BEL ¬p+} r ∈ Rdft [¬p]
and the superiority relation >′ is defined by the following conditions:
∀r′, s′ ∈ R′(r′ >′ s′ ⇐⇒ ∃r, s ∈ R : r′ ∈ elimdft(r), s′ ∈ elimdft(s), r > s)
where r and s are conflicting.
For each atom p ∈ Σ, p+ and p− are new atoms, i.e., thy do not appear in
Σ. Furthermore all new atoms generated are distinct.
Theorem 3. The transformation elimdft is correct.
Proof. Notice that the transformation elimdft is essentially the same transfor-
mation as that given in [24]. The only difference is that the rules p+ ↪→X p and
p− ↪→X ¬p are modalised with X instead of BEL. However, this difference is
flattened by the definition of social agents, where BEL converts universally and
the all modalities are involved in conflicts.
(2) Rule Loader The rule loader builds a data structure as follows: for every atom
α ∈ UD we create three entries α, INTα and OBLα. Each entry has associated
to it a list of hash tables:
For α we have
– +h is a list of (pointers to) rules in RBEL where α appears in the head;
– −h is the list of rules in RBEL where ∼α appears in the head;
– +b is the list of rules in R where α occurs in the body;
– −b is the list of rules in R where ∼α occurs in the body.
For Xα, X ∈ {INT,OBL} we have
– +h is a list of rules in RX where α appears in the head;
– −h is the list of rules in RX where ∼α appears in the head;
– +hB is a list of rules in RBEL where α appears in the head;
– −hB is a list of rules in RBEL where ∼α appears in the head;
– +b is the list of rules in R where Xα occurs in the body;
– −b is the list of rules in R where X∼α occurs in the body.
– +b∼ is the list of rules in R where ∼Xα occurs in the body;
– −b∼ is the list of rules in R where ∼X∼α occurs in the body.
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To each rule in RX , X 6= BEL, we associate a structure consisting of a (modal)
literal (the head of the rule) and a set of pointers to the modal literals in the
body of the rule, implemented as an hash table; while for belief rules we create
the same structure as the other types of rules plus two other structures one for
INT and one for OBL, the single pointer refers to the modal literal and the set
of pointers corresponds to the literals in the body modalised, respectively, with
INT and OBL.
(3) The Inference Engine The Inference Engine is based on an extension of the
Delores algorithm/implementation proposed in [12] as a computational model
of Basic Defeasible Logic. In turn
1. It asserts each fact (as an atom) as a conclusion and removes the atom from
the rules where the atom occurs positively in the body, and it “deactivates”
the rules where either the atom occurs negatively in the body, or incompat-
ible modal literals occur in the body.
2. It scans the list of active rules for rules where the body is empty. It takes
head and searches for rule (of the appropriate type) where the head is the
negation of the atom or a modal literal incompatible with it. If there are no
such rules then, the atom is appended to the list of facts, and removed from
the rules.
3. It repeats the first step.
4. The algorithm terminates when one of the two steps fails. On termination
the algorithm outputs the set of conclusions.5
It is immediate to see that the algorithm runs in linear time. Each (modal)
atom/literal in a theory is processed exactly once and every time we have to scan
the set of rules, thus the complexity of the above algorithm is O(|UD| ∗ |R|).
Given the above result it might seem that social agents are computationally fea-
sible. However, as we have seen in the previous sections there are situations (let
us call them deviant situations) where social agents do not behave as expected.
First of all, we have to identify when we have a deviant situation and what are
the reasons why we have them, and what kind of control an agent has over them.
Here we assume that a deviant situation depends on some primitive intentions of
an agent (i.e., intentions given as facts). Since these intentions are independent
of the policy the theory describe the only alternative a social agent has is to give
up some of them. In the rest of the section we study whether this is possible
and what price an agent has to pay to be social. The answer is negative; we will
provide a theory that is essentially deviant, and we will show that social agents
are (computationally) expensive.
A precise definition of the problem is provided in the next section.
5 This algorithm outputs ∂+; ∂− can be computed by an algorithm similar to this with
the “dual actions”. For ∆+ we have just to consider similar constructions where we
examine only the first parts of step 1 and 2. ∆− follows from ∆+ by taking the dual
actions.
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5.3 Restoring Sociality Problem
Instance:
Let I be a finite set of primitive intentions, OBLp a primary obligation,
and D a theory such that I ⊆ F , D ` −∂OBLp, D ` −ΣOBL∼p, D `
+∂INT∼p, D ` +ΣOBLp and D ` −ΣBEL∼p.
Question:
Is there a theory D′ equal to D apart from containing only a proper
subset I ′ of I instead of I, such that ∀q if D ` +∂OBLq then D′ ` ∂OBLq
and D′ ` +∂OBLp?
The specification of the problem is meant to formalise the situation we have
described in the previous sections. The combination of the proof tags in the
specification of the instance is only possible in case there is an applicable deontic
rule for p (+ΣOBLp) which would be otherwise unchallenged, i.e., there are no
deontic rules to support ∼p (−ΣOBL∼p) and there are no reasons to believe
the opposite, is defeated, against the sociality of the agent, by the intentionality
of ∼p obtained as a consequence of an intention of the agent (this means it
has been obtained by converting a belief rule into an intention rule). In other
terms a potentially valid obligation is blocked by a consequence of an intentional
behaviour.
Example 5 Let us the consider the theory consisting of
F = {INTp, INTs}
R = {r1 : p, s⇒BEL q r2 : ⇒OBL ∼q r3 : ⇒BEL s}
> = {r1 > r2}
r1 is a belief rule and so the rule is stronger than the deontic rule r2. In addition
we have that the belief rule is not applicable (i.e., −ΣBELq) since there is no way
to prove +∂BELp. There are no deontic rules for q, so −∂OBLq. However, rule r1
behaves as an intention rule since all its antecedent can be proved as intentions,
i.e., +∂INTp and +∂INTs. Hence, since r1 is stronger than r2, the derivation of
+∂OBL∼q is prevented against the sociality of the agent.
The related decision problem is whether it is possible to avoid the “deviant”
behaviour by giving up some primitive intentions, retaining all the (primary)
obligations, and maintaining a set of primitive intentions as close as possible to
the original set of intentions.
Example 5 (Continued). When we examine the theory we notice that both
primitive intentions concur to the prevention of the derivation of +∂OBL∼q.
These intentions are under the control of the agent. The agent has the opportu-
nity to avoid the deviant behaviour if she gives up at least one of her primitive
intentions. Accordingly, the agent has three alternatives: to give up INTp, to
give up INTs, or to give up both. The first two options minimise the difference
between the original theory and the resulting theory.
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There could be cases where, no matter what intentions are removed, the theory
will result in a deviant situation. The simplest case is where there are intentions
that are at the same time primitive and primary.
Example 6 Let the theory D be
F = {INTp}
R = {r1 : ⇒INT p r2 : p⇒BEL q r3 : ⇒OBL ∼q}
>= {r2 > r3}
In this theory we have only one primitive intention and therefore the only way
to see whether it is possible to avoid the problem is to give up that intention.
However, we have that r1 is an intention rule for p, and thus we can use it to
derive +∂INTp, which allows r2 to be used to derive an intention instead of a
belief, and consequently to prevent the derivation of an obligation against the
sociality of the agent.
Notice that, given the non-monotonic nature of defeasible logic, it is possible that
a solution to the problem is given by a superset of the original set of intentions
instead of a subset.
Example 7 Given a theory D as follows
F = {INTa, INTb}
RBEL = {r1 : INTa⇒BEL d, r2 : INTb⇒BEL d,
r3 : INTc⇒BEL ∼d, r4 : d⇒BEL e}
RINT = {r5 : ⇒INT a, r6 : ⇒INT b}
ROBL = {r7 : ⇒OBL ∼e}
>= {r3 > r1, r3 > r2, r4 > r7}
As we have seen in the previous example, throwing away the two primitive
intentions is of no avail, they are reinstated by the intention rules r5 and r6.
However, to block the side effect d of the two intentions we can introduce a
further primitive intention, INTc.
If we replace the theory D by a theory D′ obtained from D by emptying the
set of intention rules, then we have two alternatives to avoid the deviance. The
first is to drop both the primitive intentions INTa and INTb, or we can form a
new primitive intention INTc. In this case the theory obtained from adding the
new intention is, intuitively, more similar to the original theory than the theory
obtained from dropping the two primitive intentions.
Variations of the problem can be obtained by changing other parameters of
the specification. Some of these can define new types of agents. For example a
pro-active social agent might try to recover from a deviant situation by changing
the raw facts (facts that are neither primitive intentions nor primitive obliga-
tions). Thus a pro-active social agent tries to adapt the environment to her goals
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(intentions). A legalistic social agent, on other the hand, might change the set
of primitive obligations, while a cheating social agent might change the rules.
However, it is important to realise that all these variations have a structure iso-
morphic to the specification we discuss in this paper. In addition it is possible
to generalise the problem to the case of multiple deviant behaviours.
Theorem 4. The Restoring Sociality Problem is NP-complete.
Proof. We have to show that the problem is both NP and NP-hard. For the NP
part all we have to do is to notice that we can guess a theory, we compute the
extension of the theory in linear time (Theorem 1) and then verify in linear time
whether the restore conditions are satisfied.
For the NP-hard part we have to map a known NP-complete problem to the




Given a finite set U , for each u ∈ U a size s(u) ∈ Z+ and a value
v(u) ∈ Z+, and integer B and K.
Question:
Is there a subset U ′ ⊆ U such that ∑u∈U ′ s(u) ≤ B and ∑u∈U ′ v(u) ≥
K?
The knapsack problem is encoded by a defeasible theory D where R is as follows:
– INTload(u)⇒BEL load(u) for each u ∈ U .
–
∑
s(u):D`+∂BELload(u) s(u) > B ⇒INT overload
–
∑




F is given by the relationship INTload(u) ∈ F iff u ∈ U ′.
The theory of the above construction has several interesting properties. First
of all D ` +∂BELload(u) iff INTload(u) ∈ F , which means u ∈ U ′; then D `
+∂OBLgood iff either of the two conditions of the knapsack problem are satisfied;
notice that since there are no literals for ¬load(u), the computation of the rule
INTload(u) ⇒BEL load(u) can be computed independently of the rest of the
theory thanks to the modularity of DL [24], thus the sums in the antecedent
of the second and third rule can be considered as “facts” in the theory. In case
one of the condition of the knapsack problem is not satisfied we have exactly
a deviant situation as in the restoring sociality problem. The encoding of the
knapsack problem in DL is clearly linear, thus any algorithm that solves the
restoring sociality problem in polynomial time will solve the knapsack problem
in polynomial time. Therefore the restoring sociality problem is NP-complete.
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5.4 Revising Deviant Situations
In this paper we focused on what we called social agents, i.e., agents who refrain
from planning activities which may result in a violation of existing obligations.
However, we would like to stress out that the so called “restoring sociality prob-
lem”, and the computational complexity results associated with it, is not specific
to social agents, but it depends on the structure of an agent type. In particular
any agent type defined by the following parameters
Convert(X,Y ),Conflict(X,Z),Conflict(X,Y ),Conflict(Z, Y )
suffers from the same problem (of course with a different intuitive reading of the
problem).
In a similar way the transformations to remove defeaters and to empty the
superiority relation, as well as the general complexity result for the logic obtain
for all agent types (modal defeasible logic variants) isomorphic to social agents.
A first solution to the complexity of social agents is to avoid conversions.
However, we believe that this is a rather unsatisfactory approach for agents with
both internal (intentions) and external (obligations) motivational attitudes. It
is not possible to capture the notion of intentionality which is of paramount
importance when we deal with agents situated in normative contexts.
A second solution would be to assume that belief rules behaving as intention
rules (i.e., obtained from the conversion Convert(BEL, INT)) are always weaker
than deontic rules or belief rules behaving as deontic rules (i.e., where the con-
version Convert(BEL,OBL) applies). In this case the problem is with theory
like
r1 : a⇒BEL q r2 : b⇒BEL ∼q
+∂INTa +∂OBLb
r1 > r2
where r1 is at the same time stronger and weaker than r2.
6 Related Work
As was mentioned in the introduction, reasoning about mental attitudes is a
central issue in philosophy and AI. Despite the plethora of proposals devoted
to this topic, the related work that is directly relevant for this paper is mainly
the BOID architecture. The basic calculation scheme used in BOID [4] is similar
to the one proposed in this paper. It is worth noting that in [16] we show that
BOID is a particular case of the logic of [5] (and of a particular version of the
logic of [7,6] without the ⊗ operator). This is due to the use adopted there of the
superiority relation (>). However, the framework of the current paper is closer
to BOID, as we distinguish conflicts between rules for the same modality and
for different modalities. In the second case, the relation Conflict(X,Y ) assumes
that X rules are always stronger than Y ’s.
The BOID framework has four components representing respectively the be-
liefs (B), obligations (O), intentions (I) and desires (D) of the agent. The be-
haviour of each component is specified by sets of propositional logical formulas
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often in the form of defeasible rules. BOID identifies two general types of conflicts
that could arise either within each component (internal conflicts) or between the
components (external conflicts). These two types of general conflicts are further
subdivided into different subtypes which gives rise to several possible conflicts
among the mental attitudes. In order to solve possible conflicts among the at-
titudes an ordering function (ρ) is defined on rules based on the agent type.
An agent type is determined by allowing one component to overrule others. For
example, a realistic agent type can be defined by having an ordering in which
the belief component overrules any other component (BOID, BODI, BDIO etc.).
This means that in BOID a conflict resolution type is an order of overruling and
in general the order of derivation can be used to identify different types of agents.
Agent types like simple-minded (agent type where prior intentions overrule de-
sires and obligations), social (agent type where obligations overrule desires) etc.
could be defined in a similar manner. Formally an agent type is defined as a
function, ρ that assigns a unique integer to each rule. It should be noted that
the ordering function ρ assigns unique values to the rules of all components such
that the values of all rules from one component are either smaller or greater than
the values of all rules from another component.
Besides the specific result discussed in Section 5.3, the general aspects that
differentiate the current framework from BOID’s are the following:
– our proof conditions permit to derive modalised literals; accordingly, in ad-
dition to labelling rules by the elements of MOD, modalities are also made
explicit in rule antecedents, thus enriching the expressive power of the logic;
– conversions are introduced to capture some fundamental reasoning patterns
which, in most cases, should be admitted or which may in any case contribute
to characterise agent types;
– we admit that Conflict may cover only some modalities; this makes it possible
that, for any rule types X and Y that are not covered by Conflict, we can
obtain +∂Xp and +∂Y∼p;
– our logic for BIO agents has linear complexity, whereas to our knowledge
there is no analogous result for BOID.
7 Summary
The contribution of this paper is manifold. We extend the analysis of policy-
based cognitive agents with the notion of obligation and we argue that in such
case side-effects do not endanger the logical analysis but on the contrary are
beneficial to explain notions, e.g., intentionality, of paramount importance for
agents situated in normative and legal contexts.
Policy based agents are represented in DL by extendeding the logic with
the modalities of belief, intention and obligation. This choice was motivated by
the computational feasibility of the logic. We have demonstrated that the logic
has linear complexity. As far as we know this is the first result of this kind for
cognitive agents.
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Finally we have studied the notion of social agent and we have proved that
a proper and philosophically sound treatment of this notion leads to an increase
of the computational complexity of the problem. Again this is the first result of
this kind we are aware of. As we argued, the result can be easily extended to all
the other agent types for which we can have deviant situations.
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